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growth, investment, trade balance, and inflation 
 
Abstract 
This paper estimates a multi-country demand-led growth model for the EU15. A decrease in 
the share of wages in national income in isolation leads to lower growth in Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, whereas it stimulates growth in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland. However, 
a simultaneous decline in the wage share leads to an overall decline in the EU15 GDP; hence 
EU15 as a whole is a wage-led economy. Furthermore, Austria and Ireland also experience a 
decline in growth when they decrease their wage share along with their trading partners. The 
results indicate that the decline in the wage share had significant negative effects on growth 
in the EU15 and supports the case for wage coordination. We present different wage-led 
recovery scenarios and the effects on prices, investment, and net exports. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a substantial decline in the share of wages in national income in the majority 
of the European countries since the 1980s. In contrast to conventional wisdom, this 
development was associated with a poor growth performance in most European countries. 
Indeed, the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2007 and slow recovery in the aftermath shed 
light on the limitations of the conventional growth strategy in Europe.  
The Europe 2020 strategy of the European Commission (EC) as well as the national 
reform and stability programs since the Great Recession repeatedly advocate further 
deregulation of the labour markets in the name of structural reform, and wage moderation 
policies, i.e. real wage growth below the rate of growth in labour productivity, to regain 
global competitiveness, reduce unemployment and create growth (EC, 2011; EC, 2012). 
Furthermore, internal devaluation is imposed in European member states (MS) with trade 
deficit (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal) with the assumption that this will restore 
competitiveness, profitability and growth (EC, 2013). According to this thinking, 
incentivising a reallocation of resources into export-oriented industries, primarily through 
wage cuts, are the main path to growth-friendly external rebalancing within the Eurozone.  
In contrast to this mainstream assumption that wage moderation unambiguously leads to 
higher growth, this paper presents a theoretical model and an empirical analysis for Europe 
based on the Post-Keynesian theory, which develops a general theory of the effect of the 
wage share on investment, net exports, and growth, and suggests that the sign of the effect is 
an empirical matter, which depends on the structural characteristics of the countries.  
We analyse the effect of a pro-capital redistribution of income on growth in a highly 
integrated region such as the EU15. The model estimated in this paper extends the post-
Keynesian/post-Kaleckian demand-led growth model developed by Bhaduri and Marglin 
4 
 
(1990) to a multi-country framework, and aims at analysing the effects of a change in the 
wage share on growth.1 A priori one would expect a falling wage share, i.e. a rising profit 
share, to have positive direct effects on investment and net exports, but negative direct effect 
on consumption, since the marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is expected to 
be higher than that out of profit income. However, the question whether the negative effect of 
an increasing profit share on consumption overpowers the positive effects on investment and 
net exports essentially is an empirical one, depending on the relative size of the consumption 
differential, the sensitivity of investment to profit and the sensitivity of net exports to unit 
labour costs. If the total effect is negative, the demand regime is called wage-led; otherwise it 
is profit-led2.  
The post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian theoretical framework highlights the central role of 
demand in determining growth in economies operating below full employment and points out 
the dual role of wages as a cost item to the firm but also as a source of demand in the 
economy.    
The novelty of this paper is that it integrates cross-country effects of a simultaneous 
decline in the wage share on demand in Europe. Previous studies have only analysed a subset 
of European countries (i.e. Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Storm and Naastepad, 2012; Hein and 
Vogel 2008; Bowles and Boyer, 1995) or taken the Eurozone as a hypothetical aggregate 
economy without considering cross-country interactions (Stockhammer et al., 2009; Onaran 
and Galanis, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, Onaran and Galanis (2014) were the first 
to develop a coherent theoretical and empirical multi-country model for the G20 countries, 
which inspired the model in this paper.  
This paper develops a consistent estimation strategy providing new estimates for all EU15 
countries individually, including those previously not covered in the empirical literature. 
Second, we analyse the effects of a simultaneous fall in the wage share and its impact on 
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growth in the EU15 as well as on investment, net exports, and prices based on interactions 
across countries. The modelling of the total effects on investment, trade balance and inflation 
integrating national and cross-country multiplier effects is another novelty of this paper. 
Third, we present a wage-led recovery scenario, and discuss whether coordinated wage 
policies can promote higher growth with a more equitable income distribution, and present a 
feasible alternative to the current European strategy of wage restraint. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents data and stylised facts. Section 3 
presents the theoretical model. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the estimation methodology and 
results. Section 6 compares the findings to the empirical literature and section 7 presents a 
wage-led recovery scenario. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Stylized Facts 
The definitions and sources of the variables in the model are presented in Appendix A. C, I, 
X, M, Y, W and R are consumption, private investment, exports, imports, GDP at market 
prices, adjusted wages and adjusted profits in real terms.  
Profit share, 𝜋𝜋, is adjusted gross operating surplus as a ratio to GDP at factor cost, 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓; 
wage share, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤, is 1 − 𝜋𝜋. The adjusted wage share allocates a labour compensation for each 
self-employed equivalent to the average compensation of the dependent employees3. The 
sample is restricted to EU15 countries4, due to a lack of sufficient time series data for the new 
EU MS. The sample period is 1960-2013.  
Figure 1 shows the wage share in the EU15 countries. There is an overall decline in the wage 
share in the majority of the countries, particularly pronounced between the early 1980s and 
mid-2000s. The fall is more moderate in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the UK. In 
the UK, this may be due to a sharp increase in managerial income. Greece experienced a 
pronounced fall in the 1960s coming to a stop with the end of the military dictatorship in the 
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mid-1970s. Portugal exhibits an exceptional upswing followed by a significant downswing 
during the revolutionary period between 1974 and 1976 (Lagoa et al., 2014). Luxembourg, as 
an outlier, exhibits a significant increase starting in the early 1970s followed by a moderate 
decline after the early 1980s.  
Figure 1 
Overall, the share of wages in national income has declined by roughly 10 percentage 
points in the EU15 countries between their latest peak levels (in the mid-1970s or early 
1980s) and 2013. 
The secular decline in the wage share was associated with a weaker growth performance 
in the majority of countries. For instance, average growth in France declined from 5.7% in 
the 1960s to roughly 2% in the 1990s. In Italy, average growth dropped significantly from 
almost 6% in the 1960s to roughly 1.5% in the 1990s. However, growth rates increased in the 
case of Ireland and Luxembourg until the Great Recession in 2008. In the UK, average 
growth remained relatively stable, with values between 2% and 3% between the 1960s and 
2000s.   
  
3. The Theoretical Model 
We model the effects of a change in the profit share on the level of GDP by analysing the 
country level effects on the components of private aggregate demand: consumption, 
investment, exports and imports. We then estimate European interactions resulting from the 
effects of a change in the profit share of other EU15 countries. The model is based on a post-
Kaleckian framework; however, the behavioural functions also encompass standard 
Keynesian models (e.g. Blanchard, 2006). 
Consumption (C) is a function of adjusted profits (R) and adjusted wages (W)5: 
                                             𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙                         (1) 
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As in Stockhammer et al. (2009), we calculate the marginal effects of a change in the profit 
share on 𝐶𝐶 through multiplying the estimated coefficients (elasticities) of 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑙𝑙 by mean 
values of our sample 𝐶𝐶/𝑙𝑙 and 𝐶𝐶/𝑙𝑙 respectively.  
                                                        ∆(𝐶𝐶/𝑌𝑌)
∆(𝜋𝜋) = 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 − 𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊                                       (2) 
The estimates are equivalent to the difference in marginal propensity to consume out of 
profits and wages, and are expected to be negative.  
Private Investment (I) is modelled as a positive function of output and the profit share as 
an indicator for expected profitability as well as the availability of internal finance: 
                                                  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼 = 𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌 + 𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋 + 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟                     (3) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 is autonomous investment, and all parameters are expected to be positive. As a 
control variable, we include real long-term interest rate 𝑟𝑟 and is expected to have negative 
effects on investment6. The marginal effect of 𝜋𝜋 on 𝐼𝐼 𝑌𝑌⁄  is calculated as follows: 
                                                    ∆(𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌) ∆(𝜋𝜋) = 𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅                           (4) 
We model the effects of distribution on net exports using a stepwise approach that follows 
Stockhammer et al. (2009), Onaran et al. (2011) and Onaran and Galanis (2014). First, 
domestic prices (𝑃𝑃) and export prices (𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥) are a function of nominal unit labour costs, 𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐, 
and import prices, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, based on a mark-up pricing model in an imperfectly competitive 
economy. 
                       𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃 =  𝑝𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢log (𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐) +  𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚log (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)                                             (5) 
                𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 =  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢log (𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐) +  𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚log (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)                                           (6) 
 Exports (X) are a function of relative prices of exports to imports, 𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚
, and GDP of the rest of 
the world, 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤: 
                       log𝑋𝑋 = 𝑝𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚log (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁄ ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑌𝑌log (𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤) + 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒log (𝐸𝐸)                    (7) 
We include exchange rate, 𝐸𝐸, as a control variable.  
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Imports (𝑀𝑀) are a function of domestic prices relative to import prices, 𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚
, and GDP.  
                𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 = 𝑃𝑃0 + 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚log (𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁄ ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌log (𝑌𝑌) + 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒log (𝐸𝐸)                         (8) 
Again, we include exchange rate 𝐸𝐸 as a control variable.  
We calculate the marginal effect of a change in the profit share on exports/GDP as: 
     
∆(𝑋𝑋
𝑌𝑌
) ∆(𝜋𝜋) = (−) � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢) 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢) 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤) � 𝜕𝜕/𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 = (−) �𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 11−𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌 � 𝜕𝜕/𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢           (9) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 illustrates the effect of nominal unit labour costs (𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐) on 𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 and 𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃 is the effect 
of 𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 on exports. The wage share is real unit labour costs (𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐) multiplied by GDP at market 
prices divided by GDP at factor costs (𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓⁄ ). The average values of 
𝜕𝜕/𝑌𝑌
𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
 for the sample mean 
are used to convert the elasticity to marginal effects. Finally, we take the negation of the total 
effect. A similar procedure is followed for imports: 
∆(𝑀𝑀/𝑌𝑌)
∆(𝜋𝜋) = (−) �𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕 log(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢) 𝜕𝜕 log(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)𝜕𝜕 log(𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢) 𝜕𝜕 log(𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)𝜕𝜕 log(𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤) � 𝑀𝑀 𝑌𝑌⁄𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 = (−) �𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶  11−𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌 � 𝑀𝑀/𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 (10) 
The sum of partial effects of a change in π on consumption, investment, and net exports (𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋 −𝑀𝑀) is the effect on private excess demand. This, in turn, will further affect 
consumption, investment, and imports through the multiplier mechanism.   
 
3.1 Effects of a simultaneous change in the profit share  
Until now, we have ignored the effects due to a simultaneous change in distribution in 
Europe; however this overestimates the positive effects of a fall in the wage share on net 
exports. While higher openness of an economy increases the relevance of the positive effects 
of a fall in the wage share due to a higher share of net exports in GDP, European economies 
are integrated and, as recommended by the EC, all countries are trying to compete on the 
basis of wage costs. This decreases the effects of a fall in the wage share on net exports when 
it is implemented simultaneously in a variety of countries, as relative prices of exports and 
imports do not change significantly when all countries reduce their nominal unit labour costs. 
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Given the high economic integration of the European economy a full understanding of the 
simultaneous fall in the wage share requires an integrated European wide analysis. In 2013, 
the greater proportion of a MS’s total trade in goods was with partners within the EU-28 with 
an average of 62% of total exports (Eurostat, 2015). 
In the following, we present the Europe-wide effects of a simultaneous change in π based 
on a multi-country model as in Onaran and Galanis (2014).7 To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to extend the multi-country model to the EU15 countries based on 
individual country estimations. This European multiplier mechanism incorporates the effects 
of a change in 𝜋𝜋 on the aggregate demand of each economy through the changes in import 
prices and the GDP of trade partners. For the case of 15 countries, the percentage change in 
GDP of each country is: 
        
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
∆𝑌𝑌1
𝑌𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑌15
𝑌𝑌15 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥ = 𝐸𝐸15𝑥𝑥15 � ∆𝜋𝜋1⋮
∆𝜋𝜋15
� + 𝐻𝐻15𝑥𝑥15
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
∆𝑌𝑌1
𝑌𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑌15
𝑌𝑌15 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤ + 𝑃𝑃15𝑥𝑥15 � ∆𝜋𝜋1⋮
∆𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛15
� + 𝑙𝑙15𝑥𝑥15
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
∆𝑌𝑌1
𝑌𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑌15
𝑌𝑌15 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤
              (11) 
The matrices 𝐸𝐸 and 𝐻𝐻 represent the effects of a change in each country’s own π on 
demand in that particular country. 𝐸𝐸 is a matrix, whose diagonal elements are the effect of a 
change in 𝜋𝜋 in country j on private excess demand (𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝐼 + 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋/𝑌𝑌) in country j. Matrix 𝐻𝐻 
reflects the national multiplier effects and hence shows the effect of an autonomous change in 
private excess demand on aggregate demand. Matrix 𝑃𝑃 illustrates the effect of a change in 
trade partners` 𝜋𝜋 on import prices and hence on net exports in each country. Finally, matrix 
𝑙𝑙 shows effects of a change in trade partners’ GPD on exports of each country. The details 
are in appendix B.  
Solving equation (11) for �∆𝑌𝑌
𝑌𝑌
� gives us the equivalent of a European multiplier effect: 
                 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
∆𝑌𝑌1
𝑌𝑌1
⋮
∆𝑌𝑌15
𝑌𝑌15 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥ = (𝐼𝐼15𝑥𝑥15 − 𝐻𝐻15𝑥𝑥15 −𝑙𝑙15𝑥𝑥15)−1(𝐸𝐸15𝑥𝑥15 + 𝑃𝑃15𝑥𝑥15) � ∆𝜋𝜋1⋮
∆𝜋𝜋15
�                       (12) 
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3.2 Total effects on investment, net exports, and inflation 
Next we model the total effects on investment, net exports and inflation integrating both 
national and cross-country multiplier effects, which is a novelty of this paper. 
The total effect on investment determines ultimately the character of the accumulation 
regime. A strong partial effect of 𝜋𝜋 and a weak partial effect of 𝑌𝑌 on I favour a positive 
impact of pro-capital redistribution on investment, resulting in a profit-led investment 
regime �∆𝐼𝐼 𝑌𝑌⁄
∆𝜋𝜋
> 0�. In the reverse constellation a pro-capital redistribution would have a 
negative effect on investment leading to a wage-led investment regime �∆𝐼𝐼 𝑌𝑌⁄
∆𝜋𝜋
< 0�. Hence, 
even if demand is wage-led, investment can be either wage-led or profit-led (Blecker, 2015). 
The total effects will depend on whether the profitability or the accelerator effects dominate 
as well as the sign and size of the overall effect of 𝜋𝜋 on Y. We calculate the total effects on 
investment as follows:  
                                                     ∆𝐼𝐼 𝑌𝑌⁄
∆𝜋𝜋
= ��∆𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌⁄
∆𝜋𝜋
𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌
𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
� + 𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙�                                              (13) 
where ∆𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌⁄
∆𝜋𝜋
 illustrates the change in aggregate demand and 𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 reflects the elasticity of 
investment to GDP. In order to convert elasticities into marginal effects we multiply with the 
sample mean of  𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
. The first term is the ex-post multiplier indirect effect, whereas the second 
term is the direct partial profitability effect as calculated in equation (3). 
Regarding the trade balance, the total effect of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋𝜋 on net exports in 
wage-led countries will be positive and larger after the multiplier due to a fall in imports 
following lower growth; however the effect in profit-led countries is theoretically ambiguous. 
There will be a positive effect on imports due to the rise in GDP in profit-led countries, which 
partially offsets the positive price competition effects and deteriorates the trade balance 
position. Furthermore, when there is a simultaneous change in all countries, and if the EU15 
as a whole is wage-led, this leads to a decrease in trade partners’ GDP, and a negative effect 
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on exports. This may offset the positive effects via prices; hence the total effect on trade 
balance is ambiguous in both the wage-led and profit-led economies.  We calculate the post-
multiplier net export effects as: 
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where 
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where 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= 
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𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
. 
Next, we calculate the effect of an isolated change in 𝜋𝜋 in one country on inflation (∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃) as: 
          ∆𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
∆𝜋𝜋
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�
1
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The effects of a simultaneous change in 𝜋𝜋 on prices in each country is then given by:                                                
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where 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= 
𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
∆𝜋𝜋
  and  
                           𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∆𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥)𝑗𝑗∆𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = −(𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 11−𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 1𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗) 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖                                   (21) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 represents the effects of a change in 𝜋𝜋 in country i on domestic prices in country i; 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes the effects of a change in 𝜋𝜋 in country j on inflation in country i via changes in 
the import prices of country i. 
 
4. Estimation methodology 
We apply a single-equation approach in order to analyse the effects of the changes in the 
wage share on growth for EU15 countries. We estimate the distributional effects on 
individual components of private aggregate demand, which are consumption, investment, 
exports and imports for each country as is widely applied in the literature (Stockhammer et 
al., 2009; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Hein and Vogel, 2008).  
Unit root tests suggest that most of our variables are integrated of order one8. Therefore, 
we take first differences of the variables. The profit share is stationary in Greece, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK and hence we use this variable in its level in these 
countries. Error-correction models (ECM) are applied wherever statistically significant9.  
In all estimations we start with general specifications with both the contemporaneous 
values and first lags of the variables as well as a lagged dependent variable, and keep those 
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variables, which are statistically significant. Wherever there is autocorrelation, either the 
lagged dependent variable is kept or an AR(1) term is added.  
The single equation approach has several advantages. It allows for flexible modelling of 
the individual behavioural functions for single countries and to detect the precise economic 
relationships between demand and changes in income distribution (Onaran and Galanis, 
2014). Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between domestic and total effects that include 
international trade. Although it does not explicitly account for the fact that 𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼 and 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋 add 
up to private demand, we do integrate the interactions between the three components of 
demand indirectly as both investment and imports are functions of domestic GDP, which 
includes all demand components, and thereby the national multiplier effects are integrated. 
Moreover, by estimating the Europe wide multiplier effects we incorporate further effects 
on 𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼 and 𝑀𝑀.   
The main alternative, a vector autoregression model (VAR), estimates the goods market 
equilibrium in a full model and has been applied by Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) and 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), and Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) among others. The 
advantage of this approach is that the interaction between the variables can be incorporated 
and it allows for tracing effects through an entire system rather than analysing one equation at 
a time. Also, it is more suitable to deal with simultaneity bias. However, using this approach 
would require a substantial simplification of the model since it cannot handle more than five 
endogenous variables (Onaran and Galanis, 2014). In the context of our analysis that 
encompasses seventeen variables, this would lead to a significant misspecification of the 
behavioural functions and does not give a precise account of the effects of the 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 on 𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼 
and 𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋.  
The problem is that the VAR structure implies that the lagged values of all variables enter 
each behavioural function, and it becomes hard to specify each function appropriately or 
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issues of overdetermination or misspecification arise; e.g. profit income, wage income, profit 
share, and nominal unit labour costs would all be allowed to affect import prices. 
Alternatively, in order to simplify the model a single variable to reflect the wage share would 
have to be used in all equations; however then the specifications would be misspecified. 
What we currently do is to introduce the appropriate related variable in each behavioural 
equation, e.g. profit share in investment, profit and wage incomes in consumption, relative 
prices in imports, and nominal unit labour costs in price estimations, which we believe are the 
appropriate behavioural specifications, and this would not be possible in a VAR framework. 
The estimation regarding the effects on net exports alone requires the stepwise estimation of 
four separate equations. Simplified direct estimations of net exports as functions of the wage 
share applied in the former literature (e.g. Bowles and Boyer, 1995; Hein and Vogel, 2007) 
fail to detect the significant effects of labour costs on foreign demand; hence it is not our 
preferred approach. In the past decades international trade has increased substantially. As a 
consequence the estimation of the net export effect is a very sensitive part of the model. 
Specification of proper behavioural functions is thus a choice we made over the systems 
estimations.  
Furthermore, in a VAR model it is not possible to detect and decompose the precise 
economic relationships that lead to changes in demand in response to distribution using 
impulse responses or decomposition analysis, which trace the cumulative effects of changes 
in all the variables in the system following an initial shock in distribution. The single 
equation approach has the big advantage that the interpretation of the results is much clearer, 
which is crucial to understand the mechanisms of how a change in the wage share affects 
total as well as decomposed parts of aggregate demand.   
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The second major qualification relates to changes in the functional income distribution. It is 
important to recognize that income distribution is endogenous (i.e. a higher unemployment 
rate lowers the wage share, which usually takes place with a time lag). However, 
endogenising income distribution, e.g. by using an instrumental variable method, work only if 
the instrumental variables are valid instruments, and for income distribution the common 
approach is to use the lags of distribution as instruments, which raises concerns about the 
validity of the instruments as well as poses challenges regarding the degrees of freedom with 
short time series data. Using a VAR methodology, in addition to the problems of 
specification discussed above, also requires identifying some variables as simultaneously 
exogenous, and the interactions are modelled via the lagged effects only; hence this method 
also does not offer much more than assuming distribution to be exogenous in the short run 
and endogenous in the long run. Given these caveats of instrumental variable approaches as 
well as systems estimations discussed above, in order to focus on the determinants of demand 
we take the wage share as exogenous in the short run, hence we are implying that the time lag 
of the effect of output on distribution is longer than one year. 
As a result, the convenience of having a clearer interpretation using a single equation 
approach may come at the price of possible bias due to ignoring the system dimension and 
endogeneity. The main alternative of using a VAR model approach, however, comes with its 
own problems. 
 
5. Estimation Results  
The regression results for consumption are in Table 1. The hypothesis that the marginal 
propensity to consume between profit income and wage income differs is confirmed in all 
countries.  
Table 1 
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The estimation results for investment are given in Table 2. In all countries, GDP has strong 
and significant accelerator effects on private investment. The effects of 𝜋𝜋 are less robust 
across countries; it has no statistically significant effect in Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK. In these cases the effects are treated as zero when 
we calculate the total effects on private excess demand. 
Table 2 
Comparing these results to previous findings in the empirical literature (Onaran and 
Galanis, 2014; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Stockhammer et al., 2009) we find a general 
breakdown of the profit-investment nexus since the start of the Great Recession in 2007. 
Onaran et al. (2011) find that in the case of the US when interest and dividend payments are 
deducted from the profit share, there is a positive effect on investment illustrating the impact 
of financialisation on the sensitivity of investment to  𝜋𝜋. Such a correction, however, is 
beyond the scope of this paper due to limited time series data on dividend payments in most 
EU15 countries.  
The estimation results for domestic prices, export prices as well as exports and imports 
are given in Tables 3 to 6 respectively. The results are in line with our expectations, except in 
Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal there are no significant effects of 
export prices relative to import prices on exports. Similarly, we find no statistically 
significant effects of domestic prices relative to import prices on imports in the case of 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg. Appendix C summarises the effects 
of a change in 𝜋𝜋 on 𝑋𝑋/𝑌𝑌 and 𝑀𝑀 𝑌𝑌 ⁄ . The total effect does depend not only on the elasticity of 
exports and imports to relative prices and the pass through from labour costs to prices, but 
also on the share of the respective component in GDP10. As a result, in small open economies 
the effects are likely to be much larger compared to large relatively closed economies. 
Table 3 
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Table 4 
Table 5 
Table 6 
 
5.1 National effects 
Table 7 summarizes the effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋𝜋 on components of private 
aggregate demand: consumption, investment, exports and imports.  
The first column reports the partial effects on consumption. The marginal propensity to 
consume out of wages is higher than out of profits, thus a rise in 𝜋𝜋  negatively affects 
consumption. The differences between marginal propensities to consume range mostly 
between -0.23 (Ireland) and -0.564 (Greece). However, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg 
have relatively low (-0.15) albeit statistically significant negative consumption differentials11.   
The second column gives the partial effects on private investment. A 1%-point increase in 
𝜋𝜋 in the EU15 countries leads to an increase in investment with values ranging between 
0.07%-points (Netherlands) to 0.20%-points (Belgium) as a ratio to GDP. If we sum up the 
effects of an increase in 𝜋𝜋 on domestic private demand the negative effect on consumption is 
substantially larger than the positive effect on investment in absolute values in 13 out of 15 
countries12. Thus, domestic demand in the EU15 is clearly wage-led.  
The integration of the foreign sector, however, has a crucial role in determining whether 
an economy is wage-led or profit-led (Blecker, 1989). The effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋𝜋 
on net exports range between 0.05%-points (Germany) to 0.40%-points (Austria) as a ratio to 
GDP.  
Column F sums up the partial effects on private excess demand when 𝜋𝜋 increases in each 
country in isolation. Overall, large economies such as the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and 
Spain as well as some small economies such as Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, 
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Netherlands, and Luxemburg are wage-led. Two small economies, Austria and Ireland are 
profit-led when integrating the foreign sector, as well as Belgium and Denmark, which 
already had profit-led domestic demand due to low consumption differentials and high 
investment effects.  
Column G reports the multiplier, which was calculated using the elasticities of 𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼, and 
𝑀𝑀 with regard to 𝑌𝑌. The multipliers are mostly above one and range between 1.03 in Austria 
and 2.1 in Spain, with only three small open countries having a multiplier less than one 
(Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands)13.  
When multiplier effects are taken into account, the effect of a change in distribution on 
demand becomes amplified (for countries with multipliers larger than one). Column H reports 
the %-change in equilibrium aggregate demand after the multiplier mechanism.  
Table 7 
The effects of a 1%-point increase in 𝜋𝜋 on investment are diverse as can be seen in 
Appendix D. Investment regime is wage-led, i.e. the effect of a rise in 𝜋𝜋 on I/Y is negative in 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the UK whereas the 
investment regime is profit led in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, and Sweden. The effects are ranging from strong negative effects in wage-led 
countries such as Greece (-0.43) to moderate positive effects in profit-led countries (0.27) 
such as Denmark.  
The effects on the trade balance are almost always positive ranging between 0.07 (Ireland) 
and 0.32 (Austria). Belgium is an exception with a negative effect due to very low positive 
net export effects via the price channel and a strong increase in imports following the 
increase in aggregate demand.  The total effects on net exports are larger than the partial 
effects via price channels in wage-led economies, and lower in profit-led countries (compared 
to the partial effects reported in Column E in Table 7). 
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5.2 Europe-wide effects 
Next, we analyse the effects of a simultaneous 1%-point increase in π taking place in all 
EU15 countries. Column I in Table 7 presents the results. Most strikingly, two economies, 
which were profit-led in isolation – Austria and Ireland, – also start to contract after the 
incorporation of further effects on their net exports due to decreasing wage shares of their 
trade partners, which reduce export prices and GDP of the trade partners, which are wage-led. 
Thus, when everyone is pursuing the same wage competition strategy in Europe the 
expansionary effects of an increase in π are reversed as relative price effects are moderated 
and external demand dampens.  
Comparing columns H and I, wage-led economies experience even stronger negative 
effects on demand. Demand in the large economies (rather closed) such as Germany, France, 
Spain, Italy and the UK now decrease by 0.23% to 0.54%. Demand in small open economies 
such as Ireland, Greece, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Portugal decrease by values between 
0.07% and 1.03%. Greece, albeit a small open economy, stands out as a strongly wage-led 
economy due to very low sensitivity of exports to labour costs14, no significant effect of 
labour costs on imports and no significant effects of profitability on private investment. Even 
in isolation, a rise in the profit share leads to a 0.92% fall in demand, and the effect increases 
further after a race to the bottom in the wage share in Europe. Indeed, only Belgium and 
Denmark do not contract as an outcome of a simultaneous increase in 𝜋𝜋; however, the effects 
on growth diminish significantly in these countries as well and become almost economically 
insignificant, close to zero in the case of Belgium.  
Overall, a simultaneous decline in the 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 in all countries leads to a decline in the EU15 
GDP by 0.30%.  
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Next, we report the total effects on investment and net exports following a simultaneous 
1%-point increase in 𝜋𝜋 in Appendix D Table D.2. In this case 8 countries (including now also 
Austria) have a wage-led investment regime. The negative effects of a simultaneous rise in 𝜋𝜋 
on investment are larger (in absolute value) in countries with wage-led investment regimes, 
and countries with profit-led investment regimes now experience smaller increases in 
investment due to more moderate growth effects. 
Regarding the net exports effects, in all countries, the total effects of a simultaneous rise in 
𝜋𝜋  is lower (Table D2) compared to the effects of an isolated change in 𝜋𝜋  due to the fall in 
external demand. On average, however, net exports would still increase by 0.16%-points in 
the EU15 as a whole. Net exports decline only in Belgium. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to account for the exceptional behaviour of the economies during the crisis years we 
have checked the robustness of our results using a reduced sample size between 1960 and 
200715. The results are robust when estimations are repeated excluding the Great Recession 
years.  
As a second robustness check, we used unadjusted wages. We again found that the results 
are robust.  
Third, we also estimated a seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR) to check for the 
robustness of our results. Indeed, we found cross-correlation among the error terms of all six 
equations (C, I, P, Px, X, M) for the EU15 countries to be statistically significant. This is 
plausible since the EU15 represent a highly integrated economy, i.e. are affected by a 
common monetary policy. However, SUR methodology comes at a cost. First, our SUR 
estimations show that we do not increase statistical significance by applying a systems 
approach16. In contrast, in the investment specifications effects of 𝜋𝜋 on investment becomes 
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insignificant in the case of France, Spain, and Sweden, as opposed to the significant effects in 
the single equation estimations. Moreover, there are strong ‘contagion effects’ within the 
systems approach; thus a miss-specified equation in one country leads to a change in 
otherwise significant results in other country specifications. Most importantly, our overall 
findings remain robust when estimating a SUR model, e.g. the EU15 GDP declines by 0.34% 
according to the SUR results, which is very close to the result based on single country 
simulations and still indicates that Europe as a whole is wage-led.  
 
6. Comparison with the literature 
In this section we compare our results with the previous empirical research, particularly on 
the EU MS.  
There are two main estimation strategies, accompanied by an ongoing debate about the 
nature of the demand regime in advanced economies. One strand of literature is motivated by 
the analysis of a Neo-Kaleckian version of Goodwin’s cyclical growth model (e.g. Barbosa-
Filho and Taylor, 2006; Kiefer and Rada, 2015; Tavani et al., 2011). These studies focus on 
the systemic linkages between demand and distribution and treat the latter as endogenous. 
This literature applies a VAR approach to jointly estimate economic activity and 
distribution17. These models estimate a reduced form long run model with short-run cycles 
typically consisting of only the wage share and capacity utilisation18. In alignment with the 
theoretical assumption that higher profits lead to higher investment, these studies typically 
find the demand regime to be profit-led. Stockhammer (2015) argues that this literature needs 
to provide more evidence on the behavioural equations, in particular on the investment 
function, since it is viewed as the driving force of finding profit-led demand. Furthermore, a 
series of relevant financial control variables are omitted that might bias the overall findings 
(Stockhammer, 2015).  
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Kiefer and Rada (2015) estimate a VAR with only distribution and growth for a panel of 
13 OECD countries including 8 European MS19 and find weak profit-led regimes; however 
they include a mix of small open and large economies in the panel, which may have quite 
different structural parameters. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) find demand to be profit-led 
but focus exclusively on the US. A notable exception is Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) that 
estimate a VAR model for France, the UK, and the US and find weak evidence for wage-led 
demand. Tavani et al. (2011), confirm previous results of a profit-led regime in the US but a 
wage-led regime in Netherlands. Jump and Mendieta-Munoz (2015) test the wage-led 
demand hypothesis for the UK using a structural VAR approach and find evidence in favour 
of a wage-led demand regime.   
A larger group of papers apply a single equation approach estimating behavioural 
functions for consumption, investment and the external sector separately. These studies use 
annual data and usually interpret the effects as a partial goods market equilibrium with a 
focus on the medium run (Stockhammer, 2015). 
In this group, our results are in alignment with those of Onaran and Galanis (2014), Storm 
and Naastepad (2012), Stockhammer et al. (2011), Stockhammer and Ederer (2008) for 
Austria, Finland, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
Storm and Naastepad (2012) find Denmark to be wage-led in domestic demand as well as 
total demand and Belgium to be undefined. However, their estimations do not pay attention to 
unit root issues. Furthermore, international trade is modelled by means of estimating the 
effects of real unit labour costs directly on exports, and they do not estimate the effects on 
imports.  
Bowles and Boyer (1995) find profit-led regimes in total demand in Germany and France. 
However, while their paper is seminal in terms of testing strategy, they do not discuss the 
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time series properties of their variables and hence do not apply difference or error correction 
models.  
Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011), focusing on domestic demand only, find mixed results 
for Ireland, depending on the amount of lags included. However, they find perverse but 
statistically insignificant consumption effects. In alignment with our findings, the authors 
find domestic demand in Luxembourg to be wage-led.   
Hein and Vogel (2008) differ from our results regarding the Netherlands only, which they 
find to be profit-led. However, the unconventional finding that domestic demand is profit-led 
drives these results.  
Hartwig (2014) finds that demand in the OECD is slightly wage-led based on panel data 
estimations for single components of demand. Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) also apply 
panel data estimations for single equations and find demand in 18 OECD countries on 
average to be wage-led20. 
Overall, our results confirm the findings of the majority of studies that domestic demand 
tends to be wage-led; aggregate demand in large economies also tend to be wage-led, 
whereas small open economies may be profit-led due to international trade effects.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the aggregate demand 
regime in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg.  
While the results of single country versus panel data estimations are not comparable, it is 
worth noting that single equation and VAR estimation strategies have yielded contradicting 
results in some cases, mostly for the case of the US, and although the US is not the focus of 
this paper, the differences in methodologies may need further explanation21.  
Blecker (2015) emphasizes that studies, which have found profit-led economies using a 
VAR approach, have used methodologies that focus on short-run cyclical relationships22. The 
diversity of findings across the single equation estimation studies might be explained by the 
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fact that, depending on the specifications in the econometric model, they pick up short-run as 
well as long-run relationships23.  
The argument to pay attention to the time dimension of the effects has some merit since 
both studies that find profit-led demand regimes, Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) for the 
US, and Kiefer and Rada (2015) for a panel, analyse short-run cyclical dynamics. Moreover, 
as Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011) show, the estimated effects on domestic demand are 
quite sensitive to the lag length in separate time series equations for 12 OECD countries. 
With regards to the study by Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006), Stockhammer and Stehrer 
(2011) point out that the econometric results might suffer from autocorrelation problems. 
Moreover, they found the results to be very sensitive to the lag length. Increasing the lag 
length (two to four lags using quarterly data) turns the original finding of a profit-led regime 
into a wage-led one. In addition, the empirical findings for the consumption function 
(negative effects of an increase in the wage share on consumption) in Barbosa-Filho and 
Taylor (2006) are perverse.   
To summarize, there are single equation based as well as systems based estimations, which 
deliver similar results regarding the wage-led nature of the demand regime in several 
European countries (e.g. Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004 or Jump and Mendieta-Munoz, 
2015) and the differences between findings in the case of the US seem to be driven by the 
treatment of auto-correlation and lag length issues.   
In another attempt to address the potential reasons behind the profit-led finding in the 
Goodwin’s cyclical growth model, Stockhammer and Michell (2014) demonstrate 
theoretically that in a simple Minsky model extended by a reserve army distribution 
adjustment mechanism, the wage share responds positively to output but generates no 
feedback. Instead, cycles are generated through the interaction of financial fragility and 
demand with the latter not being influenced by changes in functional income distribution. 
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This holds true even if a wage-led demand regime is introduced to the model by allowing for 
a positive feedback effect from the wage share to output. Hence, finding a counter-clockwise 
motion in output-wage-share space might not be enough evidence to rule out the possibility 
of a wage-led demand regime.   
As a result, empirical studies based on Goodwin cycle models that do not control for debt 
variables might base their findings of profit-led demand on spurious correlations (Blecker, 
2015; Stockhammer, 2015).  
However, our paper, as most other studies using the single equation approach, also omits 
debt variables due to lack of long time series data for each EU15 country. A notable 
exception is Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) who control for effects of personal income 
distribution, asset prices and debt. Also, Onaran et al. (2011) integrate housing and financial 
wealth effects on consumption and find the US to be a moderately wage-led demand regime. 
 Detached from the literature on wage-led and profit-led demand regimes a study by the 
IMF (Decressin et al., 2015) has simulated a 2% wage moderation scenario in a coherent 
multi-country model including five European countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain), to discuss the short run economic impact on output. Following an exogenous 2% 
reduction in wages in all Euro area economies over two years, Euro area GDP declines by 1% 
below its level and inflation decreases by 2% points, given that monetary policy is 
constrained by the zero lower bound. The paper thus confirms one of our core results: A 
simultaneous decline in the wage share in all EU15 countries eliminates the positive 
competitiveness effects on net exports. 
 
7. Wage-led recovery scenarios 
In this section, we set out the effects of an alternative scenario of a simultaneous wage-led 
recovery in the EU15 countries over the next 5 years on growth, investment, net exports and 
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inflation. Obviously, if all countries increase their wage share by 1%-point EU15 GDP would 
go up by 0.30%24. In this scenario, however, the small open economies Belgium and 
Denmark would contract. In table 8, we illustrate an alternative scenario that takes into 
account country specific room for manoeuvre to increase the wage share.  
In this scenario, all EU15 countries follow a differentiated increase in the wage share with 
a 5%-point increase in the wage-led countries, a 3%-point increase in the intermediate group 
of Ireland and Austria, which become wage-led in the race to the bottom scenario, and a 1%-
point increase in Belgium and Denmark, which remain profit-led also in the race to the 
bottom scenario. In this scenario, all EU15 countries can grow along with an improvement in 
the 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 leading to an increase in EU15 GDP of 1.51%. Hence, there is an empirical case for 
wage-coordination to stimulate growth with equality in Europe. 
Table 8 
The effects on investment are shown in column C. In 9 European countries the positive 
accelerator effects overpower the negative profitability effects leading to a wage-led 
investment regime. Greece experiences the strongest positive effects on 𝐼𝐼 𝑌𝑌⁄  of roughly 2.4%-
points.  We find a profit-led investment regime in only six cases (Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands and Sweden). While further investment policies are undoubtedly required, 
particularly in countries with profit-led investment regimes, overall a wage-led recovery 
could generate an increase of 0.24%-points in 𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌 in the EU15.  
The effects on net exports are negative in the majority of the EU15 except Belgium and 
Denmark as can be seen in column D. While net exports/GDP decrease by only 0.05%-points 
in Ireland, it decreases by 1.40%-points in Greece. Again further industrial policy is required 
to address trade imbalances. 
Finally, we analyse to what extent a wage stimulus in the EU15 countries would exert 
inflationary pressures.  
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On average, annual inflation would rise by 1.4%-point as an outcome of a simultaneous 1%-
point increase in the wage share in the EU15 countries, and 1.2%-point following a 
differentiated increase in the wage share as suggested in alternative our scenario, as reported 
in Appendix D Table D3. The effects on inflation are not as strong as the effects on nominal 
𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 since firms might not be able translate higher costs into higher prices, particularly in 
relatively open economies25. As an outcome of our wage-led recovery scenario, the majority 
of countries would experience increasing inflation rates well below the ECB target inflation 
rate (2%). In light of a risk of deflation in the Eurozone our findings indicate that a wage 
stimulus in the EU15 would indeed help keeping the European economy away from deflation. 
Labour factor productivity in the EU15 countries increased by roughly 0.7% in the decade 
between 1997 and 2007 on average excluding the crisis years. Our alternative scenario would 
be consistent with an annual nominal wage increase of 3.1% in the EU15 on average (e.g. 
1.9% in Ireland, 3.6% in Greece).  
 
8. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis in this paper shows that a simultaneous decline in the wage share in a 
highly integrated European economy leads to a decline in growth. Hence there is room to 
stimulate demand in the current economic climate of deficient demand and sluggish growth: 
A 1%-point simultaneous increase in the wage share at the European level could lead to a 
0.30% increase in EU15 GDP. 
The negative effects of a fall in the wage share on consumption overpower the positive 
effects on investment in 13 European countries. Domestic demand is hence clearly wage-led 
in the EU15. Some small open economies may have a profit-led regime when the foreign 
sector is included due to a higher degree of openness of the economy, whereas the net export 
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effects tend not to dominate in relatively closed large economies. In isolation, we have found 
11 countries to be wage-led and 4 countries to be profit-led. 
This paper went beyond the nation state and estimated the impact of a simultaneous 
decline in the wage share on demand and hence growth in EU15 countries. In the case of a 
simultaneous fall in the wage share, the positive net export effects are essentially wiped out 
leaving profit-led demand regimes in only two countries (Belgium and Denmark). Thus, 
when all EU15 countries pursue beggar thy neighbour policies, the competitiveness effects 
will be minor, while the domestic effects dominate. Reversing these policies would promote 
growth, albeit the effects are economically not large. A cautious interpretation of the 
empirical results would suggest a more equal income distribution does not hamper growth in 
Europe. 
The results also illustrate a fallacy of composition. Even if increasing profit shares seem to 
promote growth at the national level in some profit-led economies, at the European level a 
simultaneous fall in the wage share leads to European demand deficiency as well as 
contraction, even in originally profit-led economies such as Austria and Ireland.  
The estimated model in this paper has been kept simple to analyse the role of income 
distribution in determining private demand. Possible extensions include a richer modelling of 
the government sector, i.e. the potential crowding in effects on private investment.  
The applied estimation approach might introduce some bias resulting from endogeneity 
issues and single-equation-based estimations. However, our results are robust across different 
sample sizes, and estimation methods (i.e. the use of SUR) and in alignment with the findings 
of the majority of previous studies for single countries. Moreover, our result that the EU15 in 
aggregate is wage-led is plausible against the background that the EU15 countries have low 
extra regional trade and hence represent a rather closed economy, and the domestic demand 
regime (consumption + private investment) in the EU15 is wage-led, which is a very robust 
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finding - in our study as well as in the literature on other countries. Our results, in line with 
previous literature, clearly show that the negative effects of a fall in the wage share on 
domestic consumption outweigh the expansionary effects on investment in the vast majority 
of the countries. Additionally, a simultaneous decline in the wage share in all EU15 countries 
eliminates most positive net exports effects among the trade partners in Europe. As a 
consequence the finding that the EU15 is wage-led in aggregate is in line with intuition.    
Policies of internal devaluation have been negative for demand and growth in the EU15. In 
an alternative scenario of a wage-led recovery, we have shown that it is possible for all 
countries to grow along a simultaneous differentiated increase in the wage share. If large 
wage-led economies take the initiative, egalitarian growth becomes feasible including in 
small open economies.  A recovery led by domestic demand and an increase in the wage 
share would help to restore workers’ purchasing power and tackle the issue of reliance on 
private debt to support consumption, particularly in the periphery of Europe. In countries 
such as Greece, a wage-led recovery would also increase tax revenues and contribute to a 
reduction in public debt/GDP ratio. Indeed debt sustainability would require structural 
reforms to increase the minimum wages, reinstate collective bargaining institutions, and 
increase public sector pay with an aim to increase the wage share as opposed to further 
deregulation in the labour market and wage cuts as suggested by the IMF and the EC in 
Greece.    
Furthermore, a wage-led recovery would still be consistent with annual inflation rates well 
below the ECB target. A coordinated wage stimulus is what is needed currently to keep 
Europe away from deflation.  
An increase in the wage share, interestingly, does not negatively impact the investment 
performance in the EU15 as a whole with most countries experiencing an increase in 
investment. The impact of wage increases on trade imbalances across countries require 
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further targeted industrial policy at the European level. Achieving convergence in the level of 
nominal unit labour costs and overcoming persistent imbalances requires a more 
comprehensive policy mix of wage policies, investment and industrial policies.   
Our results have important policy implications. First, if a country is wage-led, increasing 
the wage share is not an impediment to growth. Second, wage policy coordination in a highly 
integrated Europe, which tends to be wage-led, can improve growth. Third, a coordinated 
wage stimulus does not have negative effects on investment in aggregate and induced 
inflation does not conflict with the ECB target. Finally, a wage-led recovery scenario as an 
alternative to the current strategy of wage moderation implemented in the European countries 
is feasible, given that the coordination problem can be overcome.  
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Fig. 1. Wage Share (adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost, %). 
Source: AMECO online. 
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DW R2 Sample
A 0.005 0.160 0.616 2.369 0.527 1961-2013
(1.567) (4.394) *** (6.024) ***
B 0.007 0.148 0.483 2.241 0.590 1961-2013
(2.963) *** (3.832) *** (7.506) ***
DK 0.001 0.236 0.655 1.869 0.564 1961-2013
(0.323) (4.758) *** (6.262) ***
FIN 0.007 0.184 0.635 1.694 0.774 1961-2013
(2.735) *** (7.984) *** (11.061) ***
F 0.006 0.143 0.657 2.074 0.771 1961-2013
(2.751) *** (4.865) *** (10.635) ***
D 0.004 0.101 0.476 0.292 2.090 0.707 1962-2013
(1.313) (2.151) *** (4.352) .*** (2.500) **
GR 0.013 0.114 0.633 1.771 0.748 1961-2013
(3.889) *** (3.859) *** (10.282) ***
IRL 0.004 0.183 0.520 2.233 0.483 1961-2013
(0.798) (4.746) *** (5.153) ***
I 0.004 0.204 0.744 1.531 0.773 1961-2013
(1.793) * (4.713) *** (9.447) ***
L 0.016 0.103 0.350 1.741 0.350 1961-2013
(4.087) *** (3.451) *** (4.920) ***
NL -0.004 0.149 0.582 0.376 1.876 0.813 1962-2013
-(1.574) (4.807) *** (5.749) *** (3.766) ***
P 0.012 0.099 0.612 2.121 0.615 1961-2013
(3.025) *** (6.177) *** (8.195) ***
E 0.001 0.182 0.767 2.096 0.878 1961-2013
(0.278) (4.750) *** (16.751) ***
S 0.006 0.088 0.554 1.736 0.578 1961-2013
(2.279) ** (2.788) *** (7.891) ***
UK 0.005 0.209 0.702 0.273 1.944 0.718 1962-2013
(1.627) (6.744) *** (7.567) *** (1.884) *
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, 
NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
Table 1. Consumption: dependent variable dlog(C)
𝒄 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑹𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑾𝒕) (𝑨𝑹𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑪𝒕 − 𝟏)
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DW R2 Sample
A -0.025 0.110 1.881 2.018 0.526 1962-2013
-(2.828) *** (0.830) (7.359) ***
B -0.632 0.239 2.387 0.234 -0.247 0.330 1.932 0.638 1963-2013
-(4.595) *** (2.290) ** (6.527) *** (2.340) ** -(4.107) *** (4.789) ***
DK -0.038 0.321 2.929 -0.008 1.883 0.751 1963-2013
-(4.448) *** (1.948) * (11.168) *** -(2.310) **
FIN -0.038 0.174 2.067 0.322 1.841 0.752 1963-2013
-(3.451) *** (1.588) (9.138) *** (2.186) **
F -0.032 0.155 2.214 -0.002 0.541 1.940 0.826 1963-2013
-(4.221) *** (1.646) * (12.179) *** -(1.300) (4.616) ***
D -0.021 0.121 1.810 0.360 1.613 0.590 1963-2013
-(2.196) ** (0.544) (7.149) .*** (2.154) **
GR 0.028 0.091 2.293 -0.265 2.017 0.625 1962-2013
(0.513) (1.518) (9.862) *** -(1.907) *
IRL -0.036 0.338 1.802 1.988 0.416 1963-2013
-(1.976) * (1.967) * (5.004) ***
I -0.026 0.295 1.722 -0.003 0.331 1.944 0.636 1964-2013
-(2.941) *** (1.761) * (7.841) *** -(1.172) (2.293) **
L -0.029 0.160 1.728 2.410 0.273 1963-2013
-(1.420) (0.675) (4.172) ***
NL -0.392 0.130 2.681 -0.299 0.295 2.299 0.714 1961-2013
-(2.762) *** (3.030) *** (9.527) *** -(5.346) *** (5.237) ***
P -0.042 0.024 2.119 2.026 0.485 1962-2013
-(2.834) *** (0.440) (6.662) ***
E 0.099 0.134 2.720 0.415 1.994 0.769 1962-2013
(1.098) (1.664) * (9.443) *** (3.297) ***
S 0.119 0.159 2.406 0.269 1.794 0.729 1962-2013
(1.759) * (2.384) ** (9.892) *** (3.437) ***
UK -0.474 0.134 2.283 -0.243 0.261 1.909 0.677 1961-2013
-(1.815) * (1.581) (8.870) *** -(3.527) *** (3.220) ***
Table 2. Private investment: dependent variable dlog(I)
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, 
P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
𝒄 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝒕− 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒕) (𝑨𝑹𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑰𝒕 − 𝟏)𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝝅𝒕−𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒓𝒕−𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒕 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝑰𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝒀𝒕 − 𝟏)
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DW R2 Sample
A 0.005 0.286 0.453 0.146 1.920 0.851 1962-2012
(2.433) ** (4.952) *** (5.320) *** (3.715) ***
B 0.020 0.180 0.154 0.129 0.627 2.163 0.811 1962-2012
(3.797) *** (2.226) ** (5.036) *** (4.333) *** (4.829) ***
DK 0.008 0.249 0.465 0.183 2.029 0.865 1962-2012
(2.423) ** (2.698) *** (4.037) *** (5.266) ***
FIN 0.009 0.388 0.249 0.220 1.890 0.842 1962-2012
(2.511) ** (5.328) *** (2.834) *** (5.520) ***
F 0.004 0.194 0.633 0.094 1.795 0.907 1962-2012
(1.718) * (1.624) (4.635) *** (3.580) ***
D 0.017 0.382 0.006 0.699 2.091 0.834 1962-2012
(4.333) *** (7.351) *** (0.290) (6.577) ***
GR 0.019 0.423 0.462 1.758 0.810 1962-2012
(2.870) *** (5.932) *** (6.435) ***
IRL 0.031 0.256 0.284 0.431 2.111 0.678 1962-2012
(2.987) *** (1.863) * (3.744) *** (2.490) **
I 0.014 0.633 0.206 1.715 0.828 1962-2012
(3.033) *** (10.044) *** (5.279) ***
L 0.024 0.345 -0.482 0.523 1.715 0.479 1962-2012
(4.180) *** (3.284) *** -(3.605) *** (5.076) ***
NL 0.007 0.255 0.448 0.152 1.997 0.801 1962-2012
(2.492) ** (2.687) *** (3.656) *** (4.599) ***
P 0.018 0.471 0.204 0.247 1.803 0.857 1962-2012
(3.200) *** (7.345) *** (4.035) *** (4.491) ***
E 0.029 0.585 0.023 0.798 2.284 0.937 1962-2012
(2.904) *** (8.027) *** (1.093) (8.667) ***
S 0.016 0.342 0.151 0.220 0.359 1.951 0.817 1962-2012
(2.914) *** (4.107) *** (3.926) *** (5.499) *** (2.154) **
UK 0.016 0.582 0.184 1.715 0.695 1962-2012
(2.968) *** (7.530) *** (3.048) ***
Table 3. Price deflator: dependent variable dlog(P)
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = 
Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
𝒄 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒕− 𝟏) (𝑨𝑹𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕− 𝟏)𝐝𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕)
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DW R2 Sample
A 0.002 0.152 0.616 2.339 0.867 1961-2013
(1.060) (3.490) *** (15.385) ***
B 0.001 0.096 0.789 2.037 0.949 1961-2013
(0.674) (1.920) * (26.133) ***
DK 1.307 0.085 0.687 -0.643 0.223 0.385 2.045 0.916 1961-2013
(4.828) *** (1.031) (15.211) *** -(4.950) *** (4.748) *** (4.642) ***
FIN -0.003 0.185 0.776 1.569 0.879 1961-2013
-(0.811) (2.612) *** (15.279) ***
F -0.002 0.248 0.142 0.528 1.875 0.956 1962-2013
-(1.025) (4.124) *** (3.074) *** (21.465) ***
D 0.004 0.197 0.224 0.365 1.667 0.823 1962-2013
(1.653) * (3.122) *** (3.227) *** (11.266) ***
GR 1.115 0.154 0.828 -0.511 0.192 0.297 1.880 0.914 1961-2013
(3.237) *** (1.631) (12.355) *** -(4.341) *** (3.250) *** (3.536) ***
IRL 0.000 0.171 0.708 2.004 0.810 1961-2013
(0.009) (1.946) * (10.398) ***
I 0.000 0.185 0.539 0.210 -0.315 1.980 0.950 1963-2013
(0.113) (3.179) *** (19.040) *** (3.630) *** -(2.029) **
L 0.024 0.322 -0.001 1.800 0.076 1962-2013
(2.389) ** (1.704) * -(0.006)
NL 0.002 0.370 0.229 2.008 0.171 1962-2013
(0.251) (1.823) * (1.877) *
P 0.280 -0.103 0.246 0.722 -0.251 -0.382 0.053 0.330 1.834 0.930 1962-2013
(1.786) * -(1.658) * (1.845) * (14.862) *** -(2.301) ** -(4.404) *** (1.971) ** (5.082) ***
E 0.012 0.255 0.155 0.421 0.461 1.744 0.870 1963-2013
(1.483) (2.507) ** (1.716) * (11.016) *** (3.076) ***
S -0.002 0.172 0.716 1.928 0.877 1961-2013
-(0.616) (2.509) ** (16.126) ***
UK 0.558 0.136 0.577 -0.486 0.101 0.377 1.667 0.928 1961-2013
(3.051) *** (2.084) ** (13.998) *** -(4.725) *** (3.172) *** (4.975) ***
Table 4. Export price deflator: dependent variable dlog(Px)
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
𝒄 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝑿𝒕 − 𝟏) (𝑨𝑹𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕 − 𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝑿𝒕-1) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑼𝑳𝑪𝒕-1) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒎𝒕-1)
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DW R2 Sample
A -0.028 -1.728 2.314 1.778 0.676 1961-2013
-(2.813) *** -(5.717) *** (9.008) ***
B -0.029 -0.185 2.315 1.876 0.669 1961-2013
-(3.264) *** -(0.728) (10.045) ***
DK -0.004 -0.627 1.540 1.718 0.472 1961-2013
-(0.483) -(3.581) *** (6.445) ***
FIN -0.068 -0.576 3.428 0.430 2.121 0.486 1962-2013
-(3.074) *** -(2.003) ** (6.415) *** (3.077) ***
F -0.020 -0.439 2.155 0.158 0.371 2.194 0.725 1962-2013
-(1.718) * -(3.075) *** (7.689) *** (1.665) * (2.684) ***
D -0.017 -0.379 2.136 2.022 0.372 1962-2013
-(1.145) -(1.876) * (5.376) ***
GR -0.037 -0.729 2.917 1.664 0.305 1962-2013
-(1.342) -(1.805) * (3.968) ***
IRL 0.043 -0.178 1.041 0.351 1.896 0.189 1962-2013
(2.223) ** -(0.903) (2.155) ** (2.608) ***
I -0.053 -0.307 3.006 1.966 0.586 1962-2013
-(3.811) *** -(1.994) ** (8.285) ***
L -0.033 0.187 2.688 0.317 2.102 0.388 1963-2013
-(1.621) (0.789) (4.893) *** (2.064) **
NL -0.027 -0.290 2.445 0.559 2.194 0.725 1962-2013
-(2.681) *** -(1.318) (10.955) *** (4.761) ***
P -0.017 0.316 2.409 0.330 1.816 0.420 1963-2013
-(0.799) (1.354) (4.401) *** (2.383) **
E -0.012 -0.277 2.448 1.664 0.426 1961-2013
-(0.815) -(2.214) ** (6.029) ***
S -0.045 -0.508 2.715 0.497 2.037 0.575 1962-2013
-(3.009) *** -(2.915) *** (7.877) *** (3.832) ***
UK 0.001 -0.518 1.174 1.562 0.453 1961-2013
(0.152) -(3.708) *** (4.696) ***
Table 5. Exports: dependent variable dlog(X)
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, 
NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
𝒄 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷𝒙 𝑷𝒎⁄ )𝒕−𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒓𝒘𝒕) (𝑨𝑹𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒆𝒕)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝑷𝒙 𝑷𝒎)⁄ 𝒕
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DW R2 Sample
A -0.005 0.329 1.970 2.251 0.648 1962-2013
-(0.701) (1.786) * (8.114) ***
B 0.004 0.336 1.649 -0.272 2.131 0.692 1963-2013
(0.668) (3.790) *** (8.360) *** -(1.917) *
DK 0.006 -0.152 1.868 2.004 0.618 1961-2013
(0.907) -(1.272) (8.994) ***
FIN -0.007 -0.115 1.854 2.082 0.677 1961-2013
-(0.886) -(0.946) (10.137) ***
F -0.001 0.296 1.940 2.008 0.725 1962-2013
-(0.159) (3.604) *** (8.884) ***
D 0.007 0.101 2.010 0.241 1.918 0.684 1963-2013
(0.923) (1.098) (9.666) *** (1.728) *
GR 0.019 0.148 1.268 1.767 0.510 1961-2013
(1.830) * (0.772) (6.884) ***
IRL -1.578 0.174 1.351 0.230 -0.527 0.163 0.807 2.091 0.559 1962-2013
-(3.623) *** (1.417) (5.249) *** (1.839) * -(4.032) *** (1.941) * (3.909) ***
I 0.000 0.195 2.829 -0.858 2.032 0.719 1962-2013
-(0.010) (2.236) ** (10.797) *** -(3.394) ***
L 0.010 -0.025 1.230 2.146 0.490 1961-2013
(1.107) -(0.168) (6.925) ***
NL 0.007 0.145 1.589 1.873 0.727 1962-2013
(1.341) (1.930) * (9.536) ***
P -2.121 0.340 1.641 -0.555 0.411 0.858 1.636 0.551 1961-2013
-(3.979) *** (2.408) ** (5.161) *** -(4.128) *** (3.773) *** (4.141) ***
E -0.009 0.225 2.443 1.581 0.649 1962-2013
-(0.769) (2.073) ** (8.171) ***
S -0.009 0.252 2.063 2.210 0.678 1962-2013
-(1.317) (2.808) *** (9.993) ***
UK -4.300 -0.010 1.778 -0.594 0.098 1.083 2.114 0.798 1961-2013
-(5.583) *** -(0.184) (11.126) *** -(5.721) *** (2.633) *** (5.677) ***
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
Table 6. Imports: dependent variable dlog(M)
𝒄 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷 𝑷𝒎⁄ )𝒕−𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒕) (𝑨𝑹𝟏)𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝑷 𝑷𝒎)⁄ 𝒕 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒅𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒎𝒕 −𝟏) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒎𝒕 −𝟏) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝑷 𝑷⁄ 𝒎𝒕 − 𝟏) 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒀𝒕 − 𝟏)
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The effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share in only one country on: 
C/Y I/Y X/Y M/Y NX/Y
Private excess demand 
/ Y Multiplier
% Change in 
aggregate demand (F*G)
The effect of a simultanous 1%-point increase 
in the profit share on % change 
in aggregate demand 
A B C D E(C-D) F(A+B+E) G H I
A -0.277 0.000 0.234 -0.161 0.396 0.119 1.039 0.124 -0.185
B -0.151 0.206 0.000 -0.053 0.053 0.108 0.740 0.080 0.009
DK -0.155 0.169 0.185 0.000 0.185 0.198 1.246 0.247 0.107
FIN -0.243 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.074 -0.169 1.316 -0.222 -0.304
F -0.324 0.101 0.062 -0.078 0.140 -0.083 1.559 -0.129 -0.228
D -0.397 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049 -0.348 1.136 -0.395 -0.442
GR -0.564 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.099 -0.465 1.984 -0.923 -1.027
IRL -0.229 0.161 0.000 -0.074 0.074 0.006 0.863 0.005 -0.066
I -0.410 0.156 0.050 -0.087 0.137 -0.117 1.451 -0.170 -0.238
L -0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.153 0.535 -0.082 -0.128
NL -0.322 0.078 0.000 -0.069 0.069 -0.175 0.820 -0.144 -0.191
P -0.402 0.000 0.000 -0.182 0.182 -0.219 1.546 -0.339 -0.477
E -0.410 0.088 0.044 -0.068 0.113 -0.210 2.147 -0.450 -0.544
S -0.388 0.128 0.057 -0.056 0.113 -0.147 1.058 -0.155 -0.271
UK -0.252 0.000 0.074 -0.066 0.140 -0.112 1.129 -0.126 -0.195
EU15* -0.298
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, 
P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP.
Table 7. The effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share
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Table 8. The effects of a differentiated increase in the wage share on growth, investment and net exports 
Change in 
profit share
 % change in 
aggregate demand Total effect on I /Y Total effect on NX/Y
A B C D
A -3.00 1.147 0.431 -0.419
B -1.00 0.269 -0.138 0.202
DK -1.00 0.443 0.020 0.153
FIN -5.00 1.489 0.647 -0.758
F -5.00 1.120 -0.053 -0.753
D -5.00 2.195 0.684 -0.913
GR -5.00 5.123 2.358 -1.404
IRL -3.00 0.332 -0.379 -0.052
I -5.00 1.181 -0.409 -0.842
L -5.00 0.641 0.167 -0.355
NL -5.00 0.953 -0.225 -0.641
P -5.00 2.375 0.895 -1.004
E -5.00 2.713 1.024 -1.303
S -5.00 1.275 -0.095 -0.812
UK -5.00 0.959 0.144 -0.756
EU15* 1.511 0.245 -0.794
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, 
P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP.
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Appendix C 
,  
Sum
A B C D E (B*C*D) F G H I(-E*G*H/F) J K(A*B*J) L M(-K*G*L/F) I-M
A 0.524 2.099 0.152 -1.728 -0.551 0.599 0.874 0.291 0.234 0.329 0.361 0.306 -0.161 0.396
B 0.180 1.220 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.603 0.897 0.491 0.000 0.336 0.074 0.487 -0.053 0.053
DK 0.465 1.870 0.347 -0.627 -0.406 0.582 0.866 0.305 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.185
FIN 0.516 2.067 0.185 -0.576 -0.220 0.608 0.890 0.230 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.244 0.000 0.074
F 0.529 2.121 0.289 -0.439 -0.269 0.602 0.869 0.161 0.062 0.296 0.332 0.163 -0.078 0.140
D 0.382 1.617 0.253 -0.379 -0.155 0.600 0.913 0.207 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.049
GR 0.423 1.734 0.377 -0.729 -0.476 0.547 0.908 0.125 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.099
IRL 0.256 1.344 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.588 0.896 0.455 0.000 0.310 0.107 0.456 -0.074 0.074
I 0.633 2.723 0.235 -0.307 -0.196 0.586 0.913 0.165 0.050 0.195 0.336 0.165 -0.087 0.137
L 0.232 1.303 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.521 0.930 1.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.000
NL 0.461 1.855 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.916 0.428 0.000 0.145 0.124 0.385 -0.069 0.069
P 0.471 1.889 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.638 0.913 0.161 0.000 0.741 0.659 0.194 -0.182 0.182
E 0.585 2.410 0.301 -0.277 -0.201 0.614 0.913 0.149 0.044 0.225 0.318 0.144 -0.068 0.113
S 0.342 1.519 0.172 -0.508 -0.132 0.517 0.815 0.273 0.057 0.252 0.131 0.273 -0.056 0.113
UK 0.582 2.393 0.207 -0.518 -0.257 0.612 0.890 0.199 0.074 0.165 0.230 0.198 -0.066 0.140
Exports Imports
Notes : A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P 
= Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom
The marginal effect  of a 1-% point increase in the profit share on exports (and imports) is -1*the effect of a 1%-point increase in the wage share
Table C1. The marginal effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on net exports
𝜕𝑋𝑋/𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜋𝜋
𝜕𝑁𝑁𝑋𝑋/𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜋𝜋
𝜕𝑀𝑀/𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜋𝜋
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Total effect on I / Y Total effect on NX / Y
Austria 0.046 0.321
Belgium 0.226 -0.011
Denmark 0.274 0.064
Finland -0.097 0.175
France 0.049 0.181
Germany -0.123 0.204
Greece -0.425 0.309
Ireland 0.163 0.071
Italy 0.103 0.192
Luxembourg -0.021 0.101
Netherlands 0.053 0.157
Portugal -0.128 0.258
Spain -0.155 0.271
Sweden 0.062 0.201
United Kingdom -0.019 0.186
Table D1. The total effect of an isolated 1% point increase in the profit share 
on investment and net exports
Total effect on I / Y Total effect on NX / Y
Austria -0.070 0.210
Belgium 0.208 -0.050
Denmark 0.214 0.020
Finland -0.132 0.150
France 0.009 0.149
Germany -0.138 0.181
Greece -0.473 0.280
Ireland 0.141 0.038
Italy 0.081 0.168
Luxembourg -0.033 0.071
Netherlands 0.045 0.128
Portugal -0.180 0.200
Spain -0.206 0.260
Sweden 0.012 0.156
United Kingdom -0.029 0.149
Average* -0.039 0.162
Table D2. The total effects of a simultaneous 1% point increase in the profit share 
on investment and net exports
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP.
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1% point 
simultaneous
increase in the
wage share
Differentiated 
simultaneous
increase in the
wage share*
ULC Annual inflation Annual inflation Annual inflation
Austria 3.062 1.603 1.652 1.008
Belgium 1.815 0.327 0.434 0.170
Denmark 2.785 1.296 1.374 0.335
Finland 3.025 1.562 1.637 1.626
France 3.059 1.617 1.681 1.674
Germany 2.461 0.939 1.036 1.028
Greece 2.877 1.217 1.293 1.288
Ireland 2.049 0.525 0.612 0.398
Italy 4.242 2.684 2.749 2.744
Luxembourg 2.325 0.541 0.605 0.592
Netherlands 2.680 1.235 1.282 1.276
Portugal 2.702 1.272 1.343 1.340
Spain 3.581 2.095 2.177 2.173
Sweden 2.396 0.818 0.911 0.887
United Kingdom 3.477 2.025 2.092 2.085
Average** 2.836 1.317 1.392 1.242
1% point increase in the 
wage share in isolation
Notes: *The differentiated increase in ∆ws is based on the scenario illustrated in table 8 divided by 5 
to report the annual change in ∆ws and its effects on annual inflation.
Table D3. The effect of a 1% point increase in the wage share on annual inflation and 
nominal unit labour costs
** Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP.
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝐿𝐶𝐶/∆𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃/∆𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃/∆𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃/∆𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
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1 The significant fall in the wage share has also been associated with increasing personal income inequality. 
Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007) show that changes in the factor distribution of income are an important 
explanatory determinant of personal income inequality. Similarly, Atkinson (2009) argues that analysing 
changes in functional income distribution is crucial to understand trends of increasing dispersion in personal 
incomes. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on changes in functional income distribution, which allows us to 
aggregate the effects of increasing inequality on demand.  
2 For a comprehensive introduction into the debates concerning wage-led strategies see Lavoie and 
Stockhammer (2013). 
3 This methodology is used by the EC.   
4Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
5 All variables will be used in logarithmic form due to the fact that they exhibit exponential growth.  
6 We do not take log of the real interest rate since it includes negative values. 
7 Rezai (2011) and von Arnim et al. (2012) present similar theoretical models with cross-country interactions.  
8 Stationarity tests are available upon request.  
9 The t-ratios reported by Banerjee et al. (1998) are used for the speed of adjustment coefficient to test whether 
there is cointegration among the variables.  
10 As a robustness check we converted elasticities into marginal effects using the sample mean as well as the 
latest value in 2013 to take into account possible effects coming from higher trade openness. Our results 
regarding the nature of the regimes remain robust and EU15 GDP remains wage-led. 
11The results are robust when we use unadjusted wages or wage share as the regressors. Our mean differential is 
minus 0.312 and hence in alignment with previous studies, i.e. Marglin and Bhaduri (1992) find a savings 
differential of 0.37 for a sample of sixteen OECD countries. 
12 Belgium and Denmark are two exceptions in our sample. 
13 The IMF (2009) reports capital spending multipliers between 0.5 and 1.8.  
14 The EC (2013) itself highlighted the incomplete pass-through of labour-cost moderation into prices. Wage 
cuts were not passed on to export prices but absorbed by increasing profit margins, particularly in the tradable 
sector.   
15 Results are available upon request. 
16 Results are available upon request. 
17 Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) further decompose aggregate demand into individual components, rather 
than estimating behavioural equations.  
18 Capacity utilisation is usually defined as real GDP over potential GDP (e.g. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006). 
Kiefer and Rada (2015) take the OECD output gap. However, as the authors note themselves, this methodology 
can be questioned due to both methodological and theoretical problems in measuring potential output or output 
gap.   
19 Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.  
20 Including 12 EU MS: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
21 It should be noted that both scholars, in the Kaleckian and Goodwin tradition, agree on the partial effects, that 
is an increase in the wage share should increase consumption and depress investment. The disagreement is based 
on the relative size of the effects, and hence the total effects. However, as Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011) 
note, even though the Goodwin cycle based studies find profit-led demand regimes, it might not be due to 
reasons implied in Goodwin’s theory of the business cycle. As the authors show, the link between investment 
and profits seems not to be strong. We also find that changes in investment are predominantly driven by changes 
in demand rather than in income distribution. The finding of a negative consumption differential is, however, 
robust across all countries in a wide range of studies.  
22 Blecker (2015) argues that the positive effects of increased profits on investment and net exports are stronger 
in the short run, while it appears that the negative effects on consumption are likely to be more significant in the 
long run. Therefore, he suggests that while there is evidence for demand to be profit-led in the short run it is not 
relevant to the impact of a change in the wage share on long-term economic performance. 
23 In our analysis, we first estimate ECM and then choose a difference specification if there is no significant 
error correction mechanism. Hence, the short run effects are arguably the same as the long run effects. We also 
calculate long-run coefficients in our difference specifications taking into consideration lagged effects of the 
explanatory as well as dependent variables.   
24 This implies a level effect, rather than a faster growth rate. GDP hence increases by an additional 0.30% in 
one year.  
25 Stockhammer et al. (2011) find that a change in 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 by 1% will come with an increase of 0.72% in inflation 
in Germany, and show that increased openness limits the ability of firms to pass on an increase in 𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐. 
